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The Shadow Economy in Post-Soviet Tajikistan 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 The existence of a “shadow economy” which is defined here as economic activity which 
is unrecorded in official statistics and hence not subject to normal taxation and regulation, is a 
phenomenon which has been much studied in both western industrial countries and in post-
Soviet era countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR. This paper provides rough 
estimates of the lower bound of the size of the unofficial economy in Tajikistan, the poorest of 
the former Soviet Republics.  Using a  household survey, base year estimates for 1999 are 
obtained.  A series from 1991 to 2001 is constructed using a variant of the methodologies 
contained in Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) and  Eilat & Zinnes (2000).  It is 
found that shadow activities are likely to amount to close to half of all economic activities over 
the past decade, and that official GDP figures, which themselves contain an arbitrary adjustment 
for the value of shadow activities, are understated by a wide margin. 
 
 
The Shadow Economy in Post-Soviet Tajikistan∗ 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The existence of a “shadow economy” which is defined here as economic activity which 
is unrecorded in official statistics and hence not subject to normal taxation and regulation, is a 
phenomenon which has been much studied in both western industrial countries and in post-
Soviet era countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR.  It is of particular interest in these 
countries since the process of transition to a market economy involves the growth of private 
sector activities which may have been illegal in the earlier period but which, even if legal, were 
pursued entirely outside of the statistical network of the government.   
 
 Indeed the mentality of the Five Year Plan, which remains dominant in countries such as 
Tajikistan, discourages recognition of non-plan activities for two reasons:  First, any shortfall 
from those activity levels forecast by the government (note that Five Year Plans in Tajikistan are 
now called “Five Year Forecasts” and that “planned outputs” are now “forecast outputs”) is 
regarded as bureaucratically unacceptable to report and so numbers are distorted or fudged  
however much is necessary to bring them up to the level of the forecast.  Overfulfillment of the 
forecast is equally unacceptable because to admit it would simply mean that the following year’s 
forecast “targets” would  be raised to match the higher level, requiring additional effort that can 
be avoided by simply not reporting the overshooting of forecast levels.  This means that 
“shadow” activities are in many cases literally identical to official ones, differing only in that 
activity levels beyond those “forecast” are not reported. 
 
 This reasoning applies to those activities which were formerly performed by the state or 
by state companies and which are now at least nominally free of direct government planning 
(though, of course, the reality is much different).  In the newly liberalized environment since 
1991 many new activities in trading, commerce, services, and small manufacturing have sprung 
up which have no relation whatever with government entities, either historical or in the present.  
There is reason to believe that these are precisely the sectors which have grown the fastest in 
Tajikistan, since officially reported average income figures are nowhere near values reported in 
household surveys, as well as the fact that open unemployment is much less obvious in reality 
than official statistics would make it seem. Eilat and Zinnes (2000) report that official 
unemployment figures in transition countries are positively associated with levels of activity in 
the shadow economy, supporting this observation. 
 
 At the micro level, it is obvious that shadow economy activities have the potential to 
contribute substantially to family incomes and welfare.  From this point of view, such activities 
are of clear benefit, and have no obvious downside insofar as they are not inherently illegal or 
criminal.  However, there are several reasons why, from a macroeconomic point of view, 
knowledge of the size of the shadow economy is important, and attempts to bring it into the 
official economy are helpful for economic performance. 
 
                                                 
∗ This work was funded by  KPMG/Barents Group 
 First, insofar as one of the primary goals of economic policy makers is to promote 
economic growth, it is important for them to be able to recognize when they are succeeding and 
when they are failing.  If, for example, an economic policy has succeeded in promoting growth, 
economic managers may not even be aware of it if all or most of the growth has taken place in 
the unreported unofficial economy.  Thus there is no reinforcement, either positive or negative, 
when the results of policies cannot be observed. 
 
 Second, the size of the GDP and its growth rate are important elements of negotiations 
with international creditors and lending agencies.  If, for example, economic targets in IMF 
letters of intent are expressed in terms of percentages of GDP (as is the case in Tajikistan) a more 
accurate estimate of the true size of GDP would have an important effect on negotiations and 
hence on the absolute values of the targets themselves. 
 
 Third, activities which are not observed are not taxed.  While it is true that a large share 
of shadow activity is hidden precisely in order to avoid taxation, this de facto tax exemption of a  
large share of the economy results in a much higher tax burden on officially reported activity 
than would otherwise be the case.  This artificially impedes the growth of such activities, 
creating a drag on overall economic growth. 
 
 It should be  noted that the purpose of  this study is not to propose a new methodology for 
calculation of GDP nor is it recommended that various economic targets negotiated on the basis 
of a percentage of GDP be revised proportionately to the calculations presented in this paper.  In 
fact, this paper merely presents an educated guess as to what GDP might be if the current 
methodology could be applied uniformly across the economy.  Negotiated economic targets are 
set with full knowledge that a sizable shadow economy exists and should not be changed 
substantially as a result of this study.  Rather, it is in the interests of all stakeholders in Tajik 
economic policy to have a better idea of just what the true nature of the economy is, so as to 
better construct programs and policies designed to improve it. 
 
 Many of these observations have been studied in the case of developing countries and 
western industrial economies.  A good survey of this literature can be found in Schneider and 
Enste (2000).  Studies of the phenomenon in transition countries can be found in Kaufman and 
Kaliberda (1996), Johnson, Kaufman and Schleifer (1997), Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-
Lobaton (1998)  and Eilat and Zinnes  (2000),   This last study provides actual measures of the 
size of the shadow economy in transition countries, including Tajikistan.  Though this study 
adopts the methodology used by Eilat and Zinnes, it improves upon their study in the case of 
Tajikistan in several ways. 
 
1.  First, it corrects for the fact that official GDP estimates already contain an estimate of the size 
of the unofficial economy.  This estimate is not based on any concrete evidence; rather, it 
represents what is simply a guess as to the unofficial economy, and not one that is necessarily 
inclusive of all activities which would ordinarily be included in an estimate of “true” GDP.  
However, it is important to avoid double counting, hence this must be subtracted from the 
official figures for GDP that are reported. 
 
2. There are now another three years of data available 
 
3.  This study uses household survey data to generate a base year estimate of the size of the 
unofficial sector, in contrast to previous estimates, which are far more speculative. 
 
4.  This study includes non-electricity fuel use in its estimation methodology for changes in the 
shadow economy over time.  Tajikistan, being the lowest income country of all the transition 
economies at approximately $167 per capita in 2001  (as reported by the Government in its 2002 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) is more likely than higher income countries to have non-
electrified production.  Thus, more decentralized use of combustible fuels is included in the 
measure to yield a more general estimate of energy use.  See below for a discussion of this 
methodology for estimating changes in the size of the unofficial economy. 
 
 The next section provides a discussion of the methodology used to estimate the size and 
growth of the unofficial economy in Tajikistan.  It is important that the following caveats be 
stated very clearly:  
 This paper presents some adjustments to officially reported GDP which are indicative of 
a lower bound of the size of the shadow economy.  However, no comprehensive measure of the 
total shadow economy was possible or attempted.  Accordingly, no claim to knowing the true 
size of the shadow economy is made here.  Second, the methodology used to estimate changes in 
the size of the shadow economy cannot by itself provide a measure of its absolute size.  Hence 
all calculations of the changes in the shadow economy over time are dependent upon the initial 
estimate of the size.  A different estimate of the initial size will alter the level, though not the rate 
of change, of the shadow economy estimates. 
 
 
 
II. Methodology 
 
 The most obvious way to measure the size of the unofficial economy is to do it by direct 
survey methods.  Unfortunately, this is impossible both because of the implausibility of the 
accuracy of such an approach (“What money have you made recently that you didn’t tell the 
government about”) and because of its  expense.  Indeed, it is already too late to have surveys for 
all past years that would allow direct estimation of its evolution through time even if we could 
believe in the results they generated. 
 
 This means that indirect methods are needed. To achieve our goal, a time series of annual 
estimates of the size of the unofficial economy, it is necessary to divide the problem into two 
parts:  First, indirect survey means can provide us with an idea of the size of the economy in a 
base year, though it can give no idea of its changes through time.  Second, methods which rely 
on energy use or monetary measures to gauge the growth of the shadow economy can tell us how 
it has changed through time, but only cannot give us a measure of its absolute size.  Combining 
the two can give as an estimate of both:  the absolute size of the shadow economy and how this 
has changed over the years. 
 
 The first problem, estimating the size of the shadow economy in a base year, is 
accomplished using the 1999 survey of household income and expenditure performed on 2000 
households in a study done by the State Statistics Committee, Goskomstat (Goskomstat 2000) 
called the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS).  Information in this survey allows a 
measure of the expenditure levels of households which can then be compared to those derived 
from official estimates of GDP and GDP per capita.  While not allowing a comprehensive 
coverage of all aspects of the shadow economy, the coverage of household income and 
expenditure together with other household characteristics,  allows the estimation of a lower 
bound to the “true” figure for household consumption, which accounts for approximately 2/3 of 
GDP. 
 
 Other information collected in the TLSS, (See Table 1) on ownership of durable goods by 
Tajik households paints a picture of a population that is much better off than the officially 
reported per capita GDP of $178.50 would suggest.  This level of per capita income is 
comparable to that in some of the poorest Sub-Saharan African countries, which does not square 
with a population where almost half own electric or gas stoves, a quarter have a washing 
machine, more than 40% a refrigerator, and 60% a TV.  Even in rural areas, where 73% of the 
population resides, ownership of these items is quite high, indicating that official statistics are 
likely to substantially underestimate true values. 
 
 For the second problem this study follows a variant of the approach used by Eilat and 
Zinnes (2000) in using a modified total energy (rather than just electricity) measure and relating 
this to total economic activity.  Given our measure of total economic activity generated in the 
first step above, total energy use, we estimate changes in the shadow economy in the following 
way: 
 
 First, I follow Eilat and Zinnes by generating a series of changes in energy use that 
cannot be explained by price induced changes in efficiency or by changes in economic structure.  
For the first of these I use the E & Z estimated regression coefficient for the effect of energy 
price changes in transition countries of 0.25*(change in energy price from previous year).  For 
the second of these, rather than using the share of industry in GDP I use the shares represented 
by the two largest energy users in the country, namely aluminum production and cotton (which 
uses electricity for irrigation).  Again, the E & Z regression coefficient is used (in this case 0.05).  
 
 These are then used to generate a “residual” electricity series from which the effects of 
these factors have been removed: 
 
(1)  ∈ Elecresid (t)   =    ∈ Elec(t)   -   0.25* ∈ Eprice(t)   -   0.05 *  ∈  (alum+cot)/GDP(t) 
 
 It should be noted that E & Z also include an adjustment for the share of the private 
sector in GDP which is intended to represent changes in efficiency resulting from private sector 
growth. This is excluded here both because of the insignificance of the E & Z results and because 
the size of this effect, if it exists, is extremely small in the case of Tajikistan.  
 
 The next step is to obtain a series on total economic activity (TEA) from the base year 
estimate of the size of total economic activity derived for 1999 above.  To do this, we calculate 
changes in TEA (∈TEA) by using the following formula: 
 
(2) TEA(t)/TEA(99) = {TEA(t-1)/TEA(99)} * {1+∈ Elecresid(t)/100} 
 
 It should be noted that this relationship implicitly assumes a unitary elasticity of energy 
use with respect to output growth.  This is identical to the procedure in Eilat and Zinnes (2000) 
and consistent with  Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998), since we are already 
adjusting here for the same factors that they are adjusting for with their assumed elasticity of 0.9  
via the procedure through which the Elecresid variable was derived. A few simple manipulations 
using the size of official GDP relative to official GDP in 1999 (GDP99) and the size of the 
shadow economy relative to GDP in 1999 (SHAD(99)) yields the size of the shadow economy in 
other years by using the following relation: 
 
(3) SHAD(t)  =  [(TEA(t)/TEA(99))/GDP99(t)] * [1 + SHAD(99)] * 100 - 100  
 
 The value of GDP99 is taken from statistics of the Ministry of Finance as reported in the 
statistical yearbook issued in 2001 by Goskomstat.   
 
 
 
 
III. Results 
 
A. Estimate of the Size of the Shadow Economy in 1999 
 
 According to the Ministry of the Economy, official GDP figures are inflated by 25% to 
account for the shadow economy.  This figure is apparently chosen arbitrarily, and is not based 
on any actual survey evidence or other direct measurement.1  It should be noted that this 
calculation of GDP is done from the production side, i.e. it is based on physical production 
measurements from Soviet times, but is related methodologically to Value Added measurements 
from standard national income accounting. Due to the goal of this paper to compare survey 
derived shadow economy estimates with actual estimates of economic activity, the officially 
reported figures will be reduced by the 25% arbitrary adjustment that has been added to  them.  
For comparison purposes, the extent to which the “true” size of the economy differs from 
officially reported figures (which include the government’s adjustment for shadow activities) 
will also be shown. 
 
 This paper uses a measure of household expenditure based on the Tajikistan Living 
Standards Survey (TLSS) performed in 1999 by the State Statistics Committee (See Goskomstat 
1999).  This measure (See Table 2) is a per capita measure of the same portion of GDP 
accounted for by the category “Household Consumption” in the official figures which, according 
to the government, accounts for two thirds of the total.  After adjusting the per capita figures 
from the TLSS for the size of the total population, we find that the TLSS figures imply 
consumption that is on average 43% higher than those implied by official GDP.  Even if this 
adjustment is applied only to the consumption portion of GDP (two thirds of the total) this 
implies that “true” GDP is 28% higher than that officially reported.  Table 3 reports these figures 
together with the results for other adjustments discussed below. 
 
It is likely  that a substantial portion of the unobserved household expenditure noted here  
is funded through unreported worker remittances from  outside the country.  Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that a substantial number of Tajiks work outside the country, particularly in Russia and 
neighboring countries, and that they send a large share of their earnings back home to their 
families.  One corollary of this observation is  that there is a large unreported credit item in the 
Balance of Payments corresponding to these unreported remittances. 
 
 However, there are several other reasons to think that even the TLSS reported 
consumption figures are under reported.  The first of these derives from a direct estimate of food 
consumption contained in the TLSS (See Table 4).  These figures make it clear that per capita 
food consumption in rural areas is in fact more than twice that in urban areas.  In contrast, food 
expenditures  as shown in the TLSS (See Table 5) show rural consumers spending less on food 
than their urban counterparts.  The reason for this is clear and is relatively well known:  rural 
inhabitants have better food supplies because they are able to grow much of what they eat.  
These amounts of own-consumption do not show up in expenditure surveys because they are not 
associated with any expenditure, but should be included in a measure of “true” GDP. 
 
 In order to adjust for this problem, the food expenditures for rural households are 
assumed to be double those actually reported.  This figure is in fact somewhat conservative  
given the fact that this leaves rural inhabitants with assumed food expenditures that are still 
lower than those of their urban  counterparts, and also because it neglects any food consumption 
on the part of urbanites that may have derived from relatives or friends in the countryside.  As 
can be seen in Table 3,  when this adjustment is added to the TLSS estimates, the resulting 
household consumption estimates are more than double those in the official figures.  When 
applied to the two thirds of GDP which accounts for consumption, we can see that  GDP itself is 
78% larger than that officially reported. 
 
 An additional consideration relates to payment in-kind of workers in collective farms.  
Survey evidence from Birkenes (1997) estimates that 23.3% of rural workers are not paid in cash 
but rather receive in-kind payments of food, housing, clothing, etc.  Another 27.5% of collective 
farm workers receive partial in-kind payments while 30% received no payment at all.  In order to 
adjust for this problem, it is assumed that the 23.3%  of workers who receive  in-kind payments 
are consuming approximately the same as the rural average, while in the interests of making a 
conservative estimate, those workers  who are partially paid in-kind and those who were not  
paid at all are ignored though it is likely that they also are responsible for some degree of shadow 
activity not elsewhere accounted for.  As can be seen in Table 3, this additional adjustment  to 
the TLSS figures results in consumption that is 61% greater than that officially reported, while 
the implication for GDP is that it is 41% greater. 
 
 If both of these adjustments are added to the TLSS figures, it can be seen that the 
resulting consumption levels are more than twice those officially reported,  or put another way, 
“shadow” household consumption is larger than officially recorded household consumption.  The 
implication for GDP is that it is 91% higher or that “shadow” GDP is almost as large as officially 
recorded GDP.  It should be noted that, as stated above, all of the “official” GDP figures here 
have been reduced by 25% from those published to exclude the government’s own arbitrary 
adjustment for the size of the shadow economy.  If we compare the estimated size of the shadow 
economy to the reported government figures which include their own 25% adjustment, it can be 
calculated that the true size of total economic activity is 43% larger than the government’s 
estimate. 
 
 It is worth emphasizing some important caveats which apply to these estimates.  They 
are: 
 
1. Applied only to household consumption, which represents 2/3 of GDP and not all of it. 
 
2. Only two of many possible adjustments were considered since these were the only ones for 
which any concrete information was available. 
 
 Accordingly, the estimates above should be regarded as lower bounds to the true size of 
the shadow economy in Tajikistan.   
 
 
 
 
B.  Estimating Changes in the Size of the Shadow Economy 1996-2001 
 
 As discussed above in the methodology section, given a base year estimate in the size of 
the shadow economy, changes in this activity can be inferred from changes in electricity and 
other fuel consumption.  For this study, electricity consumption figures and prices were obtained 
from the Planning Directorate of Barkitajik, the state electricity production holding company. 
(See Table 6) Included in these figures were estimates of the percentage of total consumption 
accounted for by aluminum production and by irrigation.  Table 7 shows these percentages, 
which totaled approximately half of all electricity usage in the country over the years from 1990 
to 2001, while the aluminum plant alone accounted for about a third of total usage. 
 
 If the formula for generating  ∈ Elecresid (t) is applied to these figures, and this is then 
used in equations (2) and (3) together with officially reported GDP figures and the 1999 estimate 
of the size of the shadow economy reported above, a series of values for the size of the shadow 
economy can be derived for the period from 1991-2001.  These estimates are shown in Table 8. 
 
 The first column of Table 8 reports the results of this calculation as compared to 
government figures from which the government’s arbitrary 25% estimate of the size of the 
shadow economy has been removed.  Accordingly, this column is labeled as the size of total 
economic activity (shadow plus official) compared to officially recorded economy activity.  It 
can be seen that this figure has a generally decreasing trend over time, ranging from more than 
twice recorded activity early in the period to 59% greater in the latest year for which information 
is available, 2001.  As might be expected, the share of total economic activity which is captured 
by the official statistics has increased since the end of the civil war in 1997. 
 
 The second column of Table 8 reports the extent to which published government GDP 
figures (which include their own 25% adjustment for shadow activities) must be inflated to 
reflect the true size of total economic activity.   It can be seen that the official GDP figures are 
uniformly understated, by a margin ranging from 16% to 56%.  Of necessity, given the 
methodology used, the pattern of change in these figures is identical to that in the first column. 
 
 The next two columns are analogous to the first two, except that they follow the original 
methodology used by Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) in applying a 0.9 elasticity 
to generate adjusted ∈ Elec(t) estimates rather than filtering the raw percentage changes through 
adjustments for changes in prices and share of electricity to aluminum and irrigation as was done 
for the first two columns.  It can be seen that these estimates are quite similar to the first 
methodology for the years since 1998 but that there are substantial differences prior to that time.  
In particular, estimates for the first year shown, 1991 seem implausibly low, perhaps due to the 
fact that the chain multiplication method used in generating these figures has the effect of 
cumulating errors through time the further away one gets from the base year of 1999. 
 
 The final two columns of Table 8 show calculations analogous to those for the first four 
columns using estimates of total energy use rather than just electricity.  Information on 
consumption of oil and oil derivatives, gas, and coal were obtained from the Ministry of Energy, 
though data were only available for the years 1996-2000, which limited the years for which 
estimates could be generated to the years 1997-2000.2  (See Tables 9 and 10)  It can be seen that 
using total energy rather than electricity alone generates figures that are slightly higher prior to 
the based year of 1999 and slightly lower thereafter.  However, no major changes resulted from 
the use of total energy. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 It is clear that the shadow economy is a major portion of economic activity in Tajikistan.  
Even the estimates presented here, which represent a lower bound on the true size of the shadow 
economy, indicate that it is likely that unrecorded activity is likely to be nearly as large, or 
perhaps even larger, than recorded economic activity. 
 
 Even when shadow economy estimates are compared to government figures, which 
already contain an arbitrary 25% adjustment for shadow economy activity, it is clear that the true 
size of total economic activity is much larger.  Accordingly, estimates of such economic values 
as per capita GDP, which place Tajikistan in a rank comparable to some of the poorest countries 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, must be treated with caution since it is likely that they are understated by 
a large margin.  Similarly, economic targets or values which are expressed as a percentage of 
GDP are likely to be quite low when true figures for total economic activity are used. 
 
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that cross country comparisons based on these 
calculations can be very misleading.  The main reason for this is that these other countries may 
well have large shadow economies themselves, and so comparisons cannot be made directly 
between adjusted figures for Tajikistan and unadjusted figures for other countries.  In terms of 
poverty measures, the direct consumption evidence contained in the 1999 survey used in this 
paper confirms that objective conditions are quite poor for much of the population, and even if 
adjustments are made to aggregate figures, it is important not to lose sight of the important needs 
of the poorest segments of the population. 
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Table 1 
Provision of Households with Durable Goods  
in the Republic of Tajikistan 
In Percent  
Total Urban Rural 
Carpets, rugs 90.9 94.6 89.4 
Gas or electric stove 48.0 70.6 39.5 
Refrigerator 43.2 68.6 33.7 
Vacuum cleaner 4.9 15.1 1.1 
Washing machine 24.0 37.5 18.9 
Sewing machine 59.8 58.0 60.4 
Air conditioner 6.9 16.2 3.4 
Stereo or mono record player/ tape recorder 28.1 39.0 24.0 
Radio 21.6 19.9 22.3 
Black and white TV 60.0 52.4 62.8 
Coloured TV 18.6 38.4 11.2 
Video recorder 6.6 13.6 4.0 
Camera 1.5 2.8 1.0 
Bicycle 14.3 12.7 14.8 
Motorcycle 6.2 2.2 7.7 
Car 12.2 12.3 12.2 
Source:  Living Standard of the Population, Republic of Tajikistan, State Statistical 
Agency under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 1999. 
 
 
 
 Table 2 
Household Expenditures in the Republic of Tajikistan 
Average per Household 
(per month, in rubles) 
Average per Capita 
(per month, in rubles) 
 
In Per Cent 
 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Total including: 914488 87773 92879 12938 15383 12252 100 100 100 
Food expenditure 67375 60042 70115 9529 10523 9249 73.7 68.4 75.5 
Alcohol 234 317 203 33 56 27 0.3 0.4 0.2 
Tobacco 631 672 615 89 118 81 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Non-food:          
Goods 9232 10419 8788 1306 1826 1159       10.1 11.9 9.5 
Petrol 868 1303 706 123 228 93         0.9 1.5 0.8 
Medicine 1752 1512 1843 248 265 243 1.9 1.7 2.0 
Services including:          
Social 81 127 64 11 22 8 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Communication 66 184 22 9 32 3 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Transport 1325 1463 1274 187 257 168 1.4 1.7 1.4 
Housing and public utilities 3686 4429 3408 521 776 450 4.0 5.0 3.6 
Education 215 513 107 30 90 14 0.2 0.6 0.1 
Health services 297 305 294 42 53 39 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Other expenditures 5726 6487 5440 810 1137 718 6.3 7.4 5.8 
Source:  Living Standard of the Population, Republic of Tajikistan, State Statistical Agency under the Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 1999. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Size of Shadow Economy as Percent of Official GDP in 1999 
 Size of Household 
Consumption 
Relative to Official 
Figures 
Size of GDP Relative 
to Official Figures 
after Consumption 
Adjustment 
Ratio of TLSS to Official GDP 1.43 1.28 
With "Rural Own Consumption" Adjustment 2.17 1.78 
With "In Kind" Adjustment 1.61 1.41 
With Both Adjustments 2.36 1.91 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Food Security of Households in the Republic of Tajikistan 
 Average household, in kg  
Flour Vegetables Beans Rice Wheat 
Plant Oil  
and Fat 
Sugar  
and Jam 
Republic of Tajikistan 23.4 12.6 1.7 4.4 17.4 2.2 0.8 
Urban households 14.3 4.3 0.9 2.9 7.9 2.1 1.1 
Rural households 26.9 15.7 2.0 5.0 20.9 9.3 0.6 
Dushanbe 13.2 4.5 1.0 3.5 0.6 2.5 1.7 
GBAO 18.3 5.9 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.0 
Urban households 17.5 2.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.2 
Rural households 18.5 6.9 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.5 0.0 
Leninabad oblast 21.8 16.7 1.0 3.9 11.7 2.5 0.6 
Urban households 12.5 4.9 0.6 2.9 5.1 2.3 0.8 
Rural households 25.6 21.5 1.1 4.3 14.4 2.6 0.5 
Khaatlon oblast 25.0 11.9 1.8 4.3 32.9 2.1 0.5 
Urban households 17.7 3.9 1.3 2.3 24.4 1.7 0.9 
Rural households 26.6 13.7 1.9 4.7 34.7 2.2 0.5 
Rayons of Republican 
Subordination 28.5 12.4 3.2 6.7 9.0 2.2 1.1 
Urban households 14.3 3.1 0.6 3.4 3.3 1.2 0.7 
Rural households 30.3 13.6 3.5 7.1 10.7 2.3 1.1 
Source:  Living Standard of the Population, Republic of Tajikistan, State Statistical Agency under the Government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 1999. 
 
 Table 5 
Food Expenditures in the Republic of Tajikistan 
Average per Household 
(per month, in rubles) 
Average per Member  
of Household 
(per month, in rubles) 
 
In Per Cent 
 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Total including: 67375 60042 70115 9529 10523 9249 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Bread and bread products 28628 22255 31015 4050 3900 4091 42.5 37.1 44.2 
Rice 5223 4652 5436 739 815 717 7.8 7.7 7.8 
Beans 1022 810 1101 144 142 145 1.5 1.3 1.6 
Potatoes 3602 3444 3661 509 604 483 5.3 5.7 5.2 
Vegetables 4718 4338 4862 667 760 642 7.0 7.2 6.9 
Fruits 911 1302 765 129 228 101 1.4 2.2 1.1 
Preserved vegetables and fruit 169 326 109 24 57 14 0.3     0.5 0.2 
Meat and meat products 5705 6971 5231 807 1222 690 8.5 11.6 7.5 
Fish 126 216 91 18 38 12 0.2 0.4 0.1 
Eggs 1395 1830 1231 197 321 162 2.0 3.1 1.8 
Milk and dairy products 4195 2998 4640 593 525 612 6.2 5.0 6.6 
Plant oil 6203 5354 6521 877 938 860 9.2 8.9 9.3 
Sugar. Including confectionery 2987 3439 2818 422 603 372 4.4 5.7 4.0 
Tea 2210 1898 2326 313 333 307 3.3 3.2 3.3 
Salt 281 209 308 40 37 41 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Source:  Living Standard of the Population, Republic of Tajikistan, State Statistical Agency under the Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 1999. 
 
 
Table 6 
Electricity Production and Consumption  
in Tajikistan, 1991 – 2001  
Generation Consumption 
T & D 
Loss 
Average 
Price 
Year 
Millions of  
Kwh 
Millions of 
Kwh % US cents 
1991 17537 19088 9.4 3.93 
1992 16805 17637 10.7 0.20 
1993 17733 16560 12.5 0.43 
1994 16978 17150 12.6 0.42 
1995 14759 15410 11.7 0.51 
1996 14972 14059 14.6 0.68 
1997 14005 14103 14.6 0.61 
1998 14418 14663 14.3 0.35 
1999 15797 15607 14.1 0.36 
2000 14247 15580 13.9 0.35 
2001 14336 15686 14.0 0.31 
Source:  Deputy Chief of Planning of Barki-Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Electricity End Use Shares of Consumption  
in Tajikistan, 1991 – 2001  
Year 
Consumption 
by 
Aluminum 
Plant 
Price to 
Aluminum 
Plant 
Consumption 
of General 
Population 
Price to 
Population 
Consumption 
by Irrigation  
Price to 
Irrigation 
Consumption 
by Budget 
Organizations 
Price to 
Budget 
Organizations 
 
Per cent  
of Total U.S. cents 
Per cent  
of Total U.S. cents 
Per cent  
of Total U.S. cents 
Per cent  
of Total U.S. cents 
1991 38.9   6.89 15.7    
1992 40.0   0.07 15.7    
1993 33.0  15.3 0.1 15.7    
1994 31.1  20.1 0.23 15.7    
1995 31.1 0.012 23.2 0.17 14.9 0.1   
1996 28.6 0.85 27.0 0.07 17.0 0.1 0.5 0.14 
1997 28.0  31.5 0.09 17.0 0.09 3.9 0.09 
1998 32.5 1.35 34.8 0.06 14.0 0.06 4.2 0.06 
1999 34.2 0.63 35.4 0.09 13.2 0.17 4.0 0.17 
2000 30.1 0.65 37.3 0.12 18.0 0.14 4.0 0.14 
2001 32.2 0.58 34.0 0.16 16.0 0.11 4.2 0.11 
Source:  Deputy Chief of Planning of Barki-Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
Table 8   
Tajikistan 
Relative Size of Shadow Economy 
Electricity Method with 
Adjustments for Prices 
and Shares of Aluminum 
and Irrigation 
Electricity Method 
Using Uniform 
Elasticity of 0.9 Total Energy Method Electricity and Oil Only 
Year 
Total 
Economy 
Activity / 
Officially 
Recorded 
Activity 
Total 
Economic 
Activity / 
Published 
GDP 
Total 
Economy 
Activity / 
Officially 
Recorded 
Activity 
Total 
Economic 
Activity / 
Published 
GDP 
Total 
Economy 
Activity / 
Officially 
Recorded 
Activity 
Total 
Economic 
Activity / 
Published 
GDP 
Total 
Economy 
Activity / 
Officially 
Recorded 
Activity 
Total 
Economic 
Activity / 
Published 
GDP 
1992 2.08 1.56 1.37 1.03     
1993 1.55 1.16 1.52 1.14     
1994 2.00 1.50 1.81 1.36     
1995 1.88 1.41 1.64 1.23     
1996 1.81 1.36 1.82 1.37     
1997 1.80 1.35 1.95 1.46 1.99 1.99 1.87 1.40 
1998 1.92 1.44 1.87 1.40 1.98 1.48 1.93 1.45 
1999 1.91 1.43 1.91 1.43 1.91 1.43 1.91 1.43 
2000 1.73 1.30 1.76 1.32 1.69 1.26 1.62 1.22 
2001 1.59 1.19 1.58 1.19     
 
 
Table 9 
Tajikistan:  Natural Gas Consumption 
Gas 
Year From Uzbekistan Domestic Total 
 
 
-- Millions of m3 -- 
1991 1757.1 16.2 1773.3 
1992 1570.0 53.0 1623.0 
1993 1374.0. 20.0 1394.0 
1994 984.0 11.0 995.0 
1995 735.9 16.2 752.1 
1996 531.0 27.1 558.1 
1997 582.0 8.84 590.84 
1998 521.4 11.2 532.6 
1999 464.7 22.1 486.8 
2000 501.6 32.8 534.4 
2001 560.0 39.1 599.1 
Conversion factor:  0.0346 GJ/m3  
 
 
 
Table 10 
Tajikistan:  Fuel Consumption Estimates 
 
Oil Products Coal 
Year Petrol Diesel Lubricant Black Min. Oil Pitch Oil 
Oiling 
Material 
Brown 
Coal Coke Coal 
 -- metric tons -- -- 1000 metric tons -- 
1991        275.1 38.0 
1992        183.0 28.0 
1993        162.9 13.0 
1994        103.4 3.0 
1995        27.1 6.8 
1996 249,015 291,264 14,068 39,189 1,972 815 69 6.5 13.5 
1997 87,650 2,151,797 11,983 7,257 93 1,505 113 7.7 6.7 
1998 143,523 255,075 15,042 1,918 8,315 234 13 8.0 8.1 
1999 112,981 251,675 5,538 3,742 4,222 0 55 8.0 8.5 
2000 66,372 148,769 8,600 331 4,223 0 256 11.5 9.1 
          
GJ/MT 35.85 37.29 41.40 39.56 45.29 39.76 45.29 15.0 33.48 
Source:  Tajikistan Ministry of Energy 
 
Notes 
 
 
                                                 
1.  Interview with Mr. I. Bahronov, Deputy Minister of the Economy 
 
2.  All data for fuels and electricity were converted to Gigajoules (109  joules) using conversion 
factors from the Energy Information Administration Monthly Energy Review May 2002 for 
petroleum derivatives and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Bioenergy Feedstock 
Development Program for other fuels. 
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